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In looking at United States f o r e i g n  pol icy * 
i t s  goals ,  and the behind the words messages, on# 
#xp#cts to f i n d  a nat ion that is  t r u l y  d t m o c r a t i c , 
concerned with  freedom and human r i g h t s  a l l  ov#r 
the w o rl d .  T h i s  p i c t u r e  may not b# so accurate 
but that i s  what th# f o r e ig n  p o l i c y  sp##ch#s
convoy.  Not on# speech speaks of i n t e r v e n t i o n ,  
o n l y  p r o t e c t i n g  human r i g h t s ,  r e i n f o r c i n g
-f ledgl in g democracies.  I n t e r v e n t i o n s  have 
o ccu rre d,  under numerous names $ c o n f l i c t s ,  p o l i c e  
ac t io n s  and the l i k e .
The focus of t h i s  paper w i l l  be on 
p a r a m i l i t a r y  and d i r e c t  m i l i t a r y  in t e r v e n t  ions.  
P a r a m i l i t a r y  i n t e r v e n t i o n  is  “United States 
economic and mi 1i t a r y  aid to an armed insurgency 
in t e n t  on overthrowing a government deemded 
in im ic a l  to United States for eign  p o l i c y  in t e r e s t s  
and represents a proxy u t i V i  sat ion o f  force in 
s i t u a t i o n s  in which policymakers have decided that 
d i r e c t  United States i n t e r v e n t i o n  would be 
counterproduct ive* <Schraeder,  1989s 115).  I t  is 
e s s e n t i a l l y  waging war without  American 
casual t i e s .  U s u a l l y  the operat ions are conducted
by th* C t n t r i l  I n t e l l i g e n c e  Agency* they t r a i n  and 
supplyweapons to both e x i s t i n g  guer i I lit 
in surg enci es  and US organized e x i l e  invasion 
f o r c e s .  D i r e c t  in t e r v e n t i o n  i n v o l v i n g  United 
States t roops has been used numerous times since 
the Vietnam war.  “The u n d e r l y in g  motives have 
remained f a i r l y  c o n s i s t e n t .  United States leaders 
t y p i c a l l y  employ force to prevent p o l i t i c a l  
i n s t a b i l i t y  in important c l i e n t  states and to 
i n s t a l l  or preserve regimes considered f r i e n d l y  to 
perceived economic and s e c u r i t y  in ter est s*
<Schraeder * 19891 131>. J u s t i f i c a t i o n s  for 
i n t e r v e n t i o n  are always i d e a l i s t i c  and emotional 1y 
laden o b j e c t i v e s  to m o b i l i z e  and maintain  pu bl ic  
suppor t . They are r a r e 1y t r u t h f u l  and have 1 i t 11 e 
to do with the real  p o l i t i c a l , economic or 
s t r a t e g i c  reasons for  the i n t e r v e n t i o n s .  - - The 
importance of the c o n f l i c t s  are exaggerated and 
hyped in the media and the United States p o r t r a y s  
i t s e l f  as the “moral* peacekeeper who must help 
these poor oppressed people.
T h i s  paper w i l l  attempt to analyze the 
i n t e r v e n t i o n s  which have occurred s ince the 
Vietnam war ended, why they occurred,  and how a
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When the United States entered the Vietnam 
mar <or p o l i c e  act io n as i t  was o ^ i c i i l l y  
termed),  f o r e ig n  p o l i c y  was one of containment.  
The So v ie t  Union could  not be al lowed, for  any 
reason,  to continue to spread communism to other 
c o u n t r i e s .  The ‘‘Red T h re a t"  would be fought no 
matter what the c o s t • Vietnam has no resources,  
no m i n e r a l s ,  no o i l ,  no s t r a t e g i c  importance to 
the U nit ed  S ta te s ,  but the government f e l t  they 
had made a mistake in " losing* China to communism 
and they were t e r r i f i e d  of the so cal 1ed domino 
e f f e c t .  Thousands of young men died for  t h i s  
reason and the war went on and on.
Pres iden t  Nixon was elected  in 196? on h i s
promises to end the w a r . Now he was going to end 
the war was never e laborated on. The Nixon 
s t r a t e g y ,  announced in 1969 provided a r a t i o n a l  
method f o r  the eventual withdrawal  of American 
combat f o r c e s  from Vietnam. I t  a!so changed
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through m i l i t a r y  and economic a i d  and s t i l l
s t r e s s i n g  the need to maintain  committments to 
a l l i e s  (Jones? 131-33) .  Nixon did  indeed end the
war,  but v e r y  s lo w ly .
In v i r t u a l  total  secr ec y,  K i s s i ng e r  began 
h o l d i n g  secret meetings w ith  the Vietnamese 
n e g o ti a to r  Le Due Tho.  These meetings were 
revealed by Nixon in mid 1971 on nat ional  
t e l e v i s i o n .  Nixon also revealed K i s s i n g e r s  even 
more secret  p re p ar a to ry  t r i p s  to Peking.  Nixon 
made the t r i p  to China and signed the Shanghai 
Communique that s t a r t e d  the process of United 
States  r e c o n c i l l a t i o n  w it h  communist China.  The
secrecy and slowness of the ending of the war were
c o n t r i b u t e d  to the fact  that Nixon was a f r a i d  of 
the p o l i t i c a l  consequences i f  h is  ac t io ns  were 
seen as l o s i n g  or s e l l i n g  out to communism. Nixon 
was not seeking bette r  peace terms, he was s imply 
seeking time. He needed to e s t a b l i s h  h is  
a d m i n i s t r a t i o n  and prove he was not suft  on 
communism so that he could  be r e e l e c t e d .  The slow 
process of withdrawal was c a l l e d  M i e t n a m iz a t io n ,
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givitig- c e h t f d l  a# the war back *to the South ■■'■}']■
M;0 l n a m e s * .  t h i s  was o f f i c i a l  r h e t o r i c ,  the Mfe$'v 
war# not organiz#<i or #quipped to f i g h t  th# N o r t h ,  
c o r r u p t i o n  among th# hi ghost o f f i c i a l s  was 
rampant. I t  mattered l i t t l e  to Ni x o n ,  he had 
achieved h i s  goal of r e e l e c t i o n .  The Par is 
Accords,  o f f i c i a l l y  ending the war,  were signed in 
January 1973, two months a f t e r  N i x o n ' s  reelec.tJt:dn-.:
In 1975, s h o r t l y  a f t e r  the American forces p u l l e d  
out,  the anti-communi st Uietnamese regime 
co l l a p se d.
Th* V i . t n . m  Syndrom*
When the Mietnam ®>ar ended, America was t i r e d  
of war,  t i r e d  of government and despondent over 
the loss of 1 i fe that was synonoTious wi h t the word 
Mietnam. T h i s  was the beginning of the “Mietnam 
$yndromeM. Michael Kl a r e ' s  d e f i n i t i o n  is  the 
simplest  and most d i r e c t )  “ the Mietnam Syndrome i t  
the Amer i can publ i  c ' s d i s i  n c 1inat  i on to engage in 
f u r t h e r  mi 1 i t a r y  i n t e r v e n t i o n s  in in te rn a l  T h i r d  
WorId c o n f 1 lets* <K1are, i 9811 1) .  Congress backed 
up t h i s  “never ag a in ’* outlc-^d by o v e r r i d i n g  
President Nixon/s ve to  and passing the War Powers 
Act  by wel l in excess of the two*third#' .vote
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previous r a te  p r e c i p i t a t i n g  an energy c r i s i s  in 
the United Stat es .  When intervie wed  by Business 
Week magazine Secr etary  o f  State Henry Ki ssi nge r  
was asked i t  Washington would consider m i l i t a r y  
act ion in response to another rourid ot p r i c e  
increases.  Kissinger  r e p l i e d ,  " i t  is  one thing to 
use i t  in the case o f  a dispute over p r i c e ,  a 
d ispute which could be s e t t l e d  through 
n e g o t i a t i o n ,  but i t  is  another where there is  some 
actual s t r a n g u l a t i o n  of the i n d u s t r i a ! i z e d  w o r Id "  
<K1are, 1981141) » A p p ar e nt l y  not everyone in 
gover nmen t be1i eved i n M never aga i n M. Wa ter gate 
also had i t s  e f f e c t s  on the American pu bl ic  and 
Congress, the Mietnam war fostered a m i st r u s t  in 
gover nmen t and Wa ter gat e r e 1 n f or c ed i t ♦ Wh en the 
smok e c 1 ear ed f r orr* Wat er gate,  Cer a 1 d F or d was 
presi  d e n t •
Th *  F o r d  Year s
There was n o 1 on g e r c on sen su s i n gover nmen t , 
Congress m i st r u s t e d  the execut ive  branch and 
wanted the pr e s id e n ts  powers scaled down, f o r d ' s  
admin*cl«at  ion cooperated w it h  a more fo r ce fu l  
Congress, one that demanded a say i n  fo re ign
p o l i c y  m a tte rs .  The American publ ic  was concerned 
w ith  domestic matters? i n f l a t i o n ,  v i o l e n c e , crime, 
governmental c o r r u p t i o n  and drugs.  In a 1975 pol l  
the f i r s t  item of an i n t e r n a t i o n a l  or defense 
c bar act er was i n sevent een t h plac e and t h i s 
concerned keeping c lose r e l a t i o n s h i p s  with  a l l i e s .  
President  F o r d ' s  defense, m i l i t a r y  and economic 
ass istance programs encountered s t i f f  opposit ion 
in Congress.  Ford expressed concerns about 
n e o - i s o l a t i o n i s t  a t t i t u d e s .
The new a t t i t u d e  in Congress was expressed 
s t r o n g l y  in Angola.  When the Ford a d m i n is tr a t io n  
s u p p l i e d  over 3®®,®®® d o l l a r s  in covert  a id  to 
Ho1 den Robert o /s Nat i on a1 Front  for the Li  ber a t ion 
of Angola <FNLA> to ensure they won the e l e c t i o n s .  
The FNLA were m i l i t a r i l y  defeated when Cuba sent 
in 3®,60® t r o o p s . Fear of in v©lvement in another 
Uietnam prompted Congress to pass the Clark 
Amendment in 1976% p r o h i b i t i n g  any f u r t h e r  aid to 
g u e r i I l a  forces in Angola,  e f f e c t i v e l y  terminat ing 
the parami1i t a r y  o p e r a t i o n . The Mietnam Syndrome 
s t i  1 1 had a s t r o n g  h o l d i  at least  on Congress.  As 
for  the American p u b l i c , they knew 1 i i t le*.  and
eared less About the events in Angol a as long a# 
as i t  d id  not r e q u i r e  AmoricAn troops.
. C h » p t » r  2 Thft C * r t » r  Do ctr in *
In 1976, At the height of the Vietnam 
Syndrome, Jimmy C a rt e r  was e lected  p r e s id e n t .  He 
" g e n e r a l l y  Adhered to the n o n - i n t e r v e n t i o n i s t  
outlook even though some of h is  Ad vis o rs ,  notAbly 
. 'Zbigniew.'Brzezinski Advocated a mi 1 i tAry response 
to p A r t i c u l ^ r  c r i s e s "  t K l a r e ,  1981*3). A pp ar e nt ly  
President CArter  was not affected by arguments of 
thi  * t y p e . He vetoed direc  t Un i ted S t a tes 
involvement in such c o n f l i c t s  as the Zai re  
upheavals of 1976 and 1978, the I ra n ia n  Revolut ion 
and the NicarAguan c i v i l  war.
in 1979 several events occurred which 
r e s u l t e d  in a turn around of President C a r t e r ' s  
outlook and the essen t ial  weakening of the Vietnam 
Syndrome for  Congress and the American p u b l i c .
The Shah of I r a n ,  one of N i x o n ' s  surrogate 
gendarmes, was overthrown by the r e l i g i o u s  -zealot 
A y a t e l l a h  Khomeini.  T h i s  led to se r i ou s unrest  in 
the H i d d i e  East and los  of American inf l uen ce over 
one of the major ac to rs  there* The emergence o f
9
r e v o l u t i o n a r y  governments in Nicaragua and 
Grenada, h e ra ld in g  a new wave of g u e r i l l a  
upheavals in Central  America and the Caribbean.
The Iranian hostage c r i s i s ,  which incensed 
the American p u b l ic  and aroused emotional support 
for  i n t e r v e n t i o n  to release the hostages and 
mi 1i t a r y  r e t a l i a t i o n  against T h i r d  World 
t e r r o r i s t s .  The Soviet  invasion of Afgha nistan ,  
which gave the So v ie ts  and Cuba inroads in to  
A f r i c a  and the Middl e  Ea st .
A i l  these events conspired to cause the 
C a rt e r  a d m in is tr a t io n  to review United States 
s t r a t e g y  in the T h i r d  World,  p a r t i c u l a r l y  the 
Persian G u l f .  Once more a consensus emergedr 
c r i t i c a l  United States i n t e r e s t s  in the T h i r d  
World were at r i s k  and the US needed to take 
stron ger  action to protect  these i n t e r e s t s .  
Nat ional  S e c u r i t y  Advisor  Zbigniew B rz ez inski  
s ta te d ,  '* the Uni ted States was recover ing from a 
v e r y  deep phi 1o s o p h i c a l -  c u l t u r a l  c r i s i s  induced by 
the Vietnam war and was now ready to use force 
when necessary to pr ote ct  our important i n t e r e s t s "  
(S chrae der ,  j f 8 9 t 4 6 > «
1 1
Secret National  S e c u r i t y  Council  meetings 
were held and the new i n t e r v e n t i o n i s t  consensus 
was t r a n s l a te d  into  several key p r e s i d e n t i a l  
d e c i s i o n s .  These included a committment to the 
use of m i l i t a r y  power to protect  key economic 
r e s o u r c e s , e s p e c i a l 1y o i l .  The a c t i v a t i o n  of an 
assortment of u n i t s  from a l l  four m i l i t a r y  
s e r v ic e s  c a l l e d  the Rapid Deployment Force,  to be 
used for  i n t e r v e n t i o n  in the T h i r d  World.  A 
permanent dep1oyment of a c arr  i er b a t t l e  group in 
the Indian Ocean and the a c q u i s i t i o n  of new bases 
in the Indian Ocean area.
These meetings were conducted and decisions 
made in June of i 979% before the November I rania n 
hostage c r i s i s  and the December invasion of 
A f g h a n i s t a n . They were not announced to the 
American p u b l i c  u n t i 1 January  23, 1P88 in the 
State  of the Union address. Pr esi den t Car ter 
committed the United States to using force i f  
necessary to keep the o i l  f lo w in g  from the Persian 
G u l f .  “ Let our p o s it io n  be a b s o l u te l y  c l e a r ,  an 
attempt by any outside f o r c e  to gain control  of 
the Persian G u l f  w i 11 be regarded as an assault  on 
the v i t a l  i n t e r e s t s  of the United State s of
1 2
America,  and such an assaul t  w i l l  be repel  led by 
any means necessary,  in c l u d in g  m i l i t a r y  force"
<Sch rae der , 1989i4?>.
T h i s  announcement was named the "C ar te r  
Doctr in e"  and cont inues to govern US m i l i t a r y  
act ion in the Persian 6 u H .  Carter  r e l i e d  on 
d ip lo m a t ic  and economic pressures to r e s o l v e  the 
hostage c r i s i s  w h i l e  expand* ng US naval and a ir  
for ces  in the re g io n .
On December 27, 1979, Secr etary  of Defense 
Harold Brown announced the a c t i v a t i o n  of the Rapid 
Deployment Force Headquarters at MacDi11 A i r  Force 
Base F l o r i d a ,  On the same day the Soviet  Union 
invaded Afgha nistan ,  Se cr et ar y  Brown also 
achieved r e c o g n i t i o n  of h is  d o c t r i n e  on c ur b in g  
global  turbulence.  He defined the turbulence as 
the growing i n s t a b i l i t y  in the T h i r d  World which 
threatens the present world  or der .  Brown saw the 
coupsi r i o t s  and r e b e l l i o n s  in the T h i r d  World as 
a threat  to American economic s u r v i v a l ,  which 
depends on access to T h i r d  Wor1d markets and raw 
m a t e r i e l s ,  He compared the threat  of t h i s  
turbulence to the threat of communism,
These proc lamat i©ns were mild# in Jiinuiiry 1980 
when a l 1 other  US s t r a t e g i s t s  were c o n c e ntra t i ng  
on the Soviet  invasion of A f gha nis ta n,  These 
turbulences were everywhere and they were not 
caused by the Soviet  Union,  America now had 
another j u s t i f i c a t i o n  for  i n t e r v e n t i o n !  economic 
i n t e r e s t s .  On top of the problem of the 
turbulences themselves they supposedly i n v i t e d  
Soviet  i n t e r v e n t i o n .  Brown saw m i l i t a r y  
i n t e r v e n t i o n  as "the o n l y  recourse in seme 
c i r  umstancei" <K1 are,  198.it 19).
The method of c o n t r o l l i n g  t h i s  turbulence was 
to be the Rapid Deployment Force <R D F ) . The RDF 
was an “e sta b l is he d  for ce with  elaborate  
headquarters f a c i 1i t i e s  and "drawdown* r i g h t s  over 
30®i00@ Army, Navy,  Marine and A i r  Force 
personnel ,  When needed these troops could be 
a c t i v a t e d ,  deployed and sent d i r e c t l y  to b a t t l e  in 
minimum t i m e * The i n i t i a l  RDF plan c a l l e d  for  a 
small fo r c e  of 100,0®® s o l d i e r s ,  by June of 1980, 
General K e l l y  head of the RDF, d is c lo sed  that any 
for ce sent to the Persian Gulf would probably 
number 200,0®® a c t i v e  duty s o l d i e r s  plus  100,0®® 
r e s e r v i s t s  in a support c a p a c i t y ,  The Rapid
V ■ ■ V ; " i v ~ ' 'y-iy ■ :y
Deployment Force was now an army looking -for a 
bat 11ef i e l d .
President Carter  s t i l l  faced an e l e c t i o n  in 
198®, there was widespread c r i t i c i s m  of h is  
p o l i c i e s .  Many o f f i c i a l s  considered his 
ft on ~ i ft t erven t i on s t an c e as damagi. n g to rimer i c an 
i n t e r e s t s .  His handling of the Iran hostage 
c r i s i s  was portrayed in the media as inept and 
cgw a r d 1v . He f ou gh t t o r egain t he publ ic  s 
confidence.
In a March 198® statement to the Senate 
Commi 11ee on Foreign R e l a t i o n s , Secr e ta ry  of State 
Cyrus R. C’ance ou t j ined f o r e ig n  p o l i c y  goals- and 
o b j e c t i v e s .  He encouraged a new consensus b u t 1t 
around agreement on two p o i n t s .  The f i r s t  being 
the maintenance of a m i l i t a r y  balance of p e e r  ,
"As a g 1 oba 1 power , we must ma i n t ai n the gl ob « i 
m i 1i t a r y  bal a n ce . Our strength j s  important to 
our own safety  and also buttr e sse s  regional  
balances that could be upset by the d i r e c t  or 
i n d i r e c t  use of Soviet  power."
The second point  made was that “m i l i t a r y  
st r e n g th  i t  no longer enough, a ! U a n c e s , 
i n t e r n a t i o n a l  t i e s ,  economic resources and our
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ideals  must be drawn on to reduce chances of 
having to use m i l i t a r y  f o r c e . “ Also discussed 
were h is  eight  cen tral  American interests?  
physical  s e c u r i t y ,  East-West r e l a t i o n s ,  
c o n t r o l l i n g  the growth and spread of nuclear  and 
other weapons, the global  enery c r i s i s ,  f o s t e r i n g  
peace in t roubled areas of the world ,  broadening 
t i e s  to other n a t i o n s ,  the advancement of human 
r i g h t s  and global  environmental  trends (Vance,
1980 t 1 •* i@) .
Two of these in t e r e st s ?  peace in t roub led  
areas and the advancements of human r i g h t s  have 
long been used to j u s t i f y  both par a m i l i t a r y  and 
d i r e c t  i n t e r v e n t i o n  in other c o u n t r i e s  a f f a i r s .  
Peace in t roubled areas,  such as Uietnam, was used 
to remove o p p o r t u n i t i e s  for  the Soviets  to extend 
t h e i r  i n f l u e n c e .  The dove had become a hawk.
T h i s  s t r a t e g y  d id  not appear to be working 
and by J u l y  of 1980 Car ter had replaced S e c r e ta ry  
Uance w it h  S e c r e ta ry  Edmund Muskie.  In an address 
to the GI Forum in August 1980, Secretary Muskie 
r e i t e r a t e d  the o b j e c t i v e s  of the "new* American 
f o r e ig n  p o l i c y  w h i l e  at the seme time defending 
Pre sident  C a r t e r ' s  former p o l i c i e s .  He spok* of
the i n c r t t m  made in defense spending by ten 
per cent f showin g n ot the dec l i n i n g  m i l i t a r y  
strength Carter had been accused o f  advocating,  
bu t a qr owi ng one. One that wou 1 d con tinue t o 
deter the Sov 1 et T h r e a t .  Mu st ie also cr edi ted 
Carter  with deal ing with  foreign cou ntr i e s  on a 
basis of mutual respect rather than coercion or 
f o r c e .  The e f f o r t s  toward peace through 
neg o ti a t io n  and the nec e ss ity  for  s o l i d  American 
va lu es .  "We be 1 i eve, qu i t # s i mp1y , that even in 
t u r b u 1ent w o r1d , we must be loyal to our va l u e s ,  
at home and abroad. We must stand for democracy 
and human d i g n i t y ,  for f ree speech and free 
i n s t i t u t i onH <Musk i e , 1980 j 3■) .
The e l i t e s  of Washington were not swayed, 
they f i r m l y  be1i e^ed Amer i ca was du t v bound to be 
a "global  pol iceman".  I t  seems the p u b l i c ,  
inflamed by America s loss of face in the hostage 
cr i si s and f e a rf  u 1 of f ur t h er f or eign t er r or i s t  
act s ,  were not convinced e i t h e r .
C h a p f r  3 T h «  Re«oan Years
Ronald Reagan's campaigns con s ta n t l y  
c r i t i c i z e d  C a r t e r ' s  Mi n e p t “ p o l i c i e s  and al leged
mishandl ing ot c r i s e s ,  He tol d  the American 
people that our m i l i t a r y  strength and power must 
be r e sto r e d  •for us to remain economical ly strong.  
America had to maintain control  over the Middle 
East and the T h i r d  World to pr ot ec t  our i n t e r e s t s  
in these re gions .  Our dependence on oi l  and other 
resources tound in vast - quart t i t i es in these 
regions demanded i t .  The American pu bl ic  was 
convinced < he was an ac t w > and Reagan was elected  
to pr esident  in 198®. Reagan kept M s  promises to 
control  a c t i v i t i e s  in the Middle East and the 
t h i r d  WorI d, pr imar  i 1y thr ough par ami 1i t ary and 
d i r e c t  m i l i t a r y  i n t e r v e n t i o n ,  Appare nt l y  
n e g o t i a t i o n s  and diplomacy were not h is  strong 
p o i n t s .
President  Reagan had tew qualms about using 
torce to advance US tor eign p o l i c y  ob j ec t i v e s , a 
bu r geon i n g hawk. In e a r l y  po1 ic y  dec l ar a t i on s h e
denounced the Vietnam Syndrome as a temporary 
abe rra t ion  and vowed to enhance United States 
capaci t y to r  i n terven t i on abr oad <Sc hr ae der , 
1989139). In 1981 a two t r i l l i o n  d o l l a r  m i l i t a r y  
b u i l d - u p  was launched. Focusing on the Army's 
special  to r c e s ,  the N a vy 's  c a r r i e r  and amphibious
f l e e t s  und the A i r  F o r c e ' s  long© rang# a i r c r a f t  
u n i t s .  In respense to c r i t i c i s m  over t hi s  mas s iv e  
b u i l d - u p ,  Sec re ta ry  of Defense Caspar Weinbarger 
s ta te d ,  “we and our a l l i e s  have come to be 
c r i t i c a l 1v depen den t on places in the wor1d whi c h 
are subject  to great i n s t a b i l i t y  and therefore 
must u r g e n t l y  acquire a bet te r  a b i l i t y  to respond 
to c r i s e s  fa r  from our shores and to stay there as 
long as necessary” < Scot t , 1982:191).  Reagan 
e f f e c t i v e l y  used the expansion of United States 
power p r o j e c t i o n  ca p a b i1i t i e s , that were i n i t i a t e d  
by Carter  in h i s  last  months in o f f i c e ,  to move 
the United States f i r m l y  and f u l l y  in to  the r o l e  
of global  policemen.
The type of i n t e r v e n t i o n  used in the 1980's 
i s  best known as 1 ow-i  n ter»si ty c o n f l i c t ,  *'Ir« 
m i l i t a r y  *erms 1 ow-i n tensi  ty cor»f 1 i c t connotes the 
1 ow end of the spectrum of 'violence embracing 
t e r r o r i s m ,  g u e r i l l a  w a rf ar e ,  cou nter insurgency,  
ethnic  and border c o n f 1i c t s , show of force 
oper at i ons  and what the Pentagon d e c e p t i v e l y  c a l l s  
peacetime cont ingency o p e r a t i o n s ” (Schraeder ,
1989i 3 9 ) .  These types of c o n f l i c t  keep the pu bl ic  
appeased, the United States shows i t ' s  power and
muscles with bigger weapons, more p u b l i c i t y  and 
much less loss of l i f e ,  at least  for our troops.
The "Red Threa t"  was s t i l l  being embell ished 
o n, in 1983 Pentagon counter i nsur gency exper t N e i 1 
C. L iv in g s to n e  tol d  senior o f f i c e r s  at the 
National  Defense U n i v e r s i t y ' that "although the 
S ov ie ts  may not be d i r e c t l y  re sp ons ib le  for  the 
disor de r  in T h i r d - W o r l d  c o u n t r i e s ,  they view 
g u e r i l l a  warfare  as a means of undermining the 
Nest ,  wearing i t  down, n i b b l i n g  away at i t s  
p e r i p h e r i e s ,  denying i t  the s t r a t e g i c  minerals  and 
v i t a l  s t r a i t s  c r i t i c a l  to i t s '  commerce., what is  
at stake is  nothing less than the s u r v i v a l  of our 
own country and way of l i f e "  (Buckingham,
19845146). T h i s  seems to be a r e c u r r i n g  theme.
The Soviet  threat  may have c a r r i e d  more c lout  in 
the 1959"s but i t  was s t i l l  e f f e c t i v e  as a 
j u s t i f i c a t i o n  for in t e r v e n t i o n  as far as the 
p u b l ic  was concerned, as long as the in t e r v e n t io n  
was s h o r t ,  winnable,  and involved  low loss of l i f e  
r i s k s .
Secr etary  of Defense'Weinberger stuck c l o s e l y  
to these c r i t e r i a  when l a y i ng  out h is  gui de l i ne s  
for  i n t e r v e n t i o n » At a 1984 National  Press Club
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Speech he argued against sending US forces into  
combat unless the stakes were v i  ta 1, and then the 
troops must be sent with  the clear i n t e n t i o n  of 
w inning .  *The forces should serve c l e a r l y  defined 
p o l i t i c a l  and m i l i t a r y  o b j e c t i v e s  and should be 
l i m i t e d  to the l e v e l s  needed to do j u s t  t h a t . "  
There must also be "some reasonable assurance of 
popular and congressional  support and the 
committment of US forces to combat should be a 
last  r e s o r t . (Weinb erger , 1984il>.
There were s t i l l  a few doves l e f t  in 
Washington. Most of the in t e r v e n t i o n s  dur ing 
Reagan's terms in o ff  ic e  fol lowed these g u i d e l i n e s  
a!though the 1983 Grenada "rescue m i s s i o n H, the 
1906 Libyan a i r  s t r i k e s  and the 1987 Persian G u l f  
naval operat ions were done without  any form of 
e x p l i c i t  congressional  a u th o r iz a t i o n  or 
d e c l a r a t i o n s  of war.
App are nt l y  S ec re ta ry  of State George P.
Shultz  be l ie ve d  the Mietnam Syndrom© was well  and 
t r u l y  dead, he opposed the withdrawal of forces 
from Lebanon af te r  the Marine barracks attack.  He 
responded to Weinberger 's  ” t imoroutness” in a 
speech.
Shu I 12 stated,  “ there is  no such thing 
as guaranteed publ i c  support in advance.
Amer i c an s w i 11 always be r e 1u c t a n t to u se 
fo r c e .  But a great power cannot f ree i t s e l f  
so e a s i l y  tr-w... f he burden or choice.  I t  
must bear r e s p o n s i b i 1i t y  for the 
consequences of i t s  in act ion as 
well  as for  the consequences 
of i t s  a c t io n s .  The use of force is  
1eg it im a te when i t  can f u rt h e r  the 
cause of freedom and enhance in t e r n a t io n a l  
s e c u r i t y . . . and on such occasions we w i l l  
be able to count on the f u l l  support of 
the American people" (Luttwak,  1985:55; .
The Reagan Doc t r l n  e bo t h i n t en si f i es and 
departs from past United States p a r a m i l i t a r y  
i n t erven t i on s in the Th i rd Nor Id .  I t  ,sr o v  l des a 
compr ehensive i deological  1y based pr ogram f or 
arming insur geneies in tent on over throwing sel f 
proclaimed communist T h i r d  Nor Id regimes 
<C a r p e n t e r , 1986s4) . The doctr  i ne is  no 1onger 
hidden from publ ic v ie w ,  i t is  an open 1 y .announced 
p o l i c y  of i n t e r v e n t i o n  in the name of democracy 
and anticommunism. P a r a m i l i t a r y  in t e r v e n t i o n  was 
used four times under President  Reagan. Ar» 
overvi  ew of each instance f o i l o w s .
Afghanistan -  The Soviet  Union invaded 
Afghanistan in 1979 to prop up a communist regime 
threatened by growing g u e r i l l a  i nsurgency.  The 
Uni ted States  responded by a i d i ng  the g u e r i l l a  
forces who c a l l e d  themselves the mujahedin.  In
1988 the United States and the Sovi et  Union signed 
the Geneva Accords and the Soviet  Union promised 
to completely withdraw troops by February 15 1989. 
There were two problems $ the mujahedin r e j e c t e d  
the peace accord and refused to share power with  
the Soviet  supported communist government.
Secondly the Geneva Accords al low the United 
States to cont inue aid  to the mujahedin as long as 
the S ov ie ts  continue to arm the communist 
government. Both have committed themselves to 
n o n - i n t e r f e r e n c e  and n o n - i n t e r v e n t i o n  wh i le  
c o n t in u in g  to do so. Covert support for the 
mujahedin began in 1988', was p u b l i c l y  supported by 
Congress in 1985 and total  l ed over 1858 m i l l i o n  by 
1987. The Soviets  have withdrawn, high cos ts ,  
loss of l i f e  and pu bl i c  o utcry  in the USSR 
demanded i t .  The f i g h t i n g  cont inue s.  Nothing has 
been changed or solved,  the mujahedin are not 
l i k e l y  to have close p o l i t i c a l  t i e s  to the United 
States government i f  they do gain power. They are 
not the democratic freedom f i g h t e r s  portrayed by 
Reagan but an I si amic fundamentalist  f a c t i o n ,  more 
on the l i n e s  of the A y a t o l 1 ah Khomeini Iran than a 
democracy.
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Cambodia - I n  1978 Vietnam invaded Cambodia, 
overthrew the Khmer Rouge government of Pol Pot 
and i n s t a l l e d  a Soviet  backed puppet government. 
Ten years later  the Vietnamese s t i l l  maintained an 
occupation army of 100,608 troops to combat three 
g u e r i l l a  groups threatening the pro-Vietnamese 
regime. The g u e r i l l a  groups, a loose cohesion 
11 11ed the Coa 1i t ion Cover nmen t of Democr at i c 
Kampuchea (C6DK) have been r e c e i v i n g  n o n - l e t h a l  
covert  aid since 1982 t o t a l l i n g  more than 35 
m i l l i o n  as of 1988. T h i s  a id  was compl emen ted by 
3 .5  m i l l i o n  a year in covert  aid author ize d by 
Congress through the Solarz amendment in 1985.
The main group composing the COOK is the Khmer 
Rouge, so even i f  the g u e r i 11 as p r e v a i 1, the 
ensuing government w i l l  be a Pro-Chinese communist 
regime headed by the Khmer Rouge. So much tor 
democ racy  an d an t i c ommun i s t i c for  © i gn po1i c y 
o b j e c t i v e s .
Angola -  The Reagan ad m in is tr a t io n  managed to 
get the Clark  amendment repealed in 1985 by 
denouncing Angola as a Soviet  puppet in A f r i c a  and 
p o r t r a y i n g  S a v im b i 's  UN1TA g u e r i l l a  forces as 
democratic freedom f i g h t e r s .  Congress au thor ized
15 m i l l i o n  per year in covert  p a r a m i l i t a r y  ai d ,  
■funnelled through Z a i r e ,  to back UNITA, The goal 
of the United States involvement were to achieve 
wi t h drawa1 of Cu ban f ore es f rom An gola and 
pressure the government to accept a pother sharing 
r o l e  i th UNITA. I t  is  h i g h l y  l i k e l y  that 
withdrawal  of Cuban forces w i l l  leave c o n t i n u i n g  
c i v i l  c o n f l i c t .
Nicaragua and the Contras -  In 197? Anastacio  
Somoza, a United States supported d i c t a t o r  was 
over t h r own by a r evo1u t i on led by the Sa nd i n i s t a s , 
s e l f  p r o c 1 aimed Marx i s t s . The San dinistas  
e s t a b U s h e d  c 1ose l i n k s  w ith  Cuba and the Soviet  
Union and provided assistance to other 
r e v o l u t i o n a r y  movements in Central  America,  
not a b l y  El  Salvador .  O f f i c i a l  ad m in is tr a t io n  
j u s t i f i c a t i o n s  for supp or t ing the Contras in t he ir  
f i g h t  against  the Sandinistas  wavered between 
’‘ i n t e r d i c t i n g  arms being sent to Sal v -d o r  an 
g u e r i l l a s ,  f o r c i n g  the Sandininstas to democratize 
t h e i r  system of governance and l i m i t i n g  Soviet  and 
Cuban in f l ue nce in the r e g i o n ,  the real aim seemed 
to be to over throw1 the Sandi n i sta regime** 
(Schraeder ,  1989s128).
»ji
T h e r e  was g r e a t  p u b l i c  debate and con t r o v e r s  
o ve r backi  ng the Con t r a s . The Uni ted St ?tes 
p o l i c y  of s u p p o r t i n g  the C o n t r a s  was d e c l a r e d  
i l l e g a l  by the Wo r l d  C o u r t ,  opposed by the 
m a j o r i t y  of  N i c a r a g u a n s  and d i s p u t e d  by a 
s i g n i f i c a n t  number of n a t i o n s  w i t h i n  C e n t r a l  
Amer i c a  as w e l l  as w i t h i n  the i n t e r n a t i o n a l  
sy s t em. C on gr ess a u t h or i 7. ed m i l i t a r y  a i d  in 1 ^82 
but  because of p r e s s u r e  f rom these o t h e r  f o r c e s  
had r edu c ed US su ppor t to 1 imi t i e d  amou r» t s of 
h u m a n i t a r i a n  a i d  by 1 '^S'S. Many c o n t e n d  that  
U n i t e d  S t a t e s  s u p p o r t  has f o r c e d  the S a n d i n i s t a s  
t o r e  1 y mor e heavi  1 y on Cuban and Sov 1 e t a 1 d , the 
exac t  o p p o s i t e  of  US f o r e i g n  p o l i c y  o b j e c t i v e s .  
( S c h r a e d e r ,  I98f*? 121- 28)  .
During President  Reagan's terms numerous 
d i r e c t  i n t e r v e n t i o n s  occurred a l s o .  The major 
d i f f e r e n c e s  between these i n t e r v e n t i o n s  and those 
that oc c u r red pr i or t o Wor 1 d War I I  is that mo s t 
of these were m u l t i n a t i o n a l  undertakings rather  
than u n i l a t e r a l .  T h i s  has been done to " p r e s e r v e  
the impression that mi 1i t a r y '  a c t i o n " against 
another cou nt ry  is cons ist ent  with  pr o v is io ns  of 
t he Uni t ed Na t i on s C h a r t e r ,  wh1 c h e x p 1i c i 11y
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r ec ogn i z es bat h an 1 n d i v i  du a > an d -a c o 1 I ec t i v© 
r i g h t  of s e l f - d e f e n s e "  < Schr a e d e r , 1989s135) . The
c o l l e c t i v e  r i g h t  a l l e y s  j o i n t  a c t i o n s  'against  
t h r © a t s i n a r e g i o n . A M  of t h e*e i n t erven t i on « 
ar e c a l l e d  mg 1 1 1 1 a t er a 1 a c t i o n ?  wh en in f a c t  they 
a r © US ©n t © rpr i s e s , ©/, e l u d i n g  th© L ibyan a ir 
s t r i k e s ,  whi ch were uni  l a t e r a l  . F o l l o w i n g  i s  an 
o v e r v i e w  of these i n c i d e n t s .
El Salvador - At th© beginning of his 
Presidency,  Reagan attempted to stay on f r e i n d l y  
terms with Congress. He sent advisors to £1 
Salvador to aid ir. thier  war against g u e r i l l a  
for ces ,  but 1imited US troop strength to 5S and 
p r o h i b i t e d  advisors from accompanying Salvadoran 
forces i n t o  the f i e l d .  T h i s  eluded the War'-Powers 
Act wh i le  s t i l l  maintainin g a United States 
m i l i t a r y  presence.
Lebanon -  The l s r a e l i  invasion in 1982 gave 
the Reagan a d m in is tra t ion  an o p p o rt u n it y  to occupy 
the country  *s head of a m u lt in a t io n a l  
peac ek eep i n g -force* I t  a 1 so a 1 1 owed t hem t o t r y 
and r e c t i f y  some unwanted developments in Lebanon. 
The Uni ted States supported Amin Semayel 
government had tne l o y a l t y  of only one fact ion
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among many and wir e un ab 1 e t o asf #r t c on tr o! over 
any s iz e a b l e  port* on of the cpunt r y * The bombi ng 
of the US Mar in# ba rra ck s,  which k i l t e d  241, 
seemed to d e f l a t e  any ideas of Lebanon as an a l l y  
and the Un i t ed States w i t hdr ew.
Grenada -  In October 1983, the l e f t i s t  r u l e r  
Bishop was overthrown by a r i v a l  f a c t io n  in his 
New Jewel Movement. Although the Reagan 
a d m in is t r a t io n  had re pe at ed ly  c r i t i c i z e d  Bishop 
for  his t i e s  to Cuba* the United States almost 
immediately invaded Grenada s t a t i n g  that the 
"United States was responding to a request from 
the p r e v i o u s l y  obscure O rg anizat i on  of Eastern 
Caribbean States <OECS> for act ion against a 
threat  to the peace of the region" (Schraeder ,
1989i 139).  U n o f f i c i a l l y  Reagan wanted to oust a 
regime that was considered " i n i m i c a l  to US 
i n t e r e s t s . * As e a r l y  as ! 9 i l > US troops were 
sta gin g mock invasions of Grenada. Members of 
DECS provided a few troops and weapons but i t  was 
o bv io u s ly  a US o p e r a t io n .  The quick response time 
of six days between the overthrow and invasion 
ra is e d  quest ions about p r i o r  p l an n in g .  "Another 
p o r t i o n  of the o f f i c i a l  Uni ted States
j u s t i f i c a t i o n ,  that the i r»vas i on was pr imar 1 1 y a 
Mrescue mission" to protect  some 788 American 
medical students at St .  Georges U n i v e r s i t y  Medical 
School also s t r a i n s  c r e d u l i t y "  < Sc breeder ,
19-8?i 14 P .
Reagan also apparent ly  forgot  to include 
Congress in the decis ion making process,  they were 
t o l d  of the invasion only hours before i t  
o ccu rre d.  " T h i s  move seemed c a l c u l a t e d  to 
neut r a 1i ze an y c r i t i c ism or opposit  i o n , a mo t i ve 
that also may have c o n t r ib u t e d  to the 
u n pr ec e de n t e d de c i s i o n t o p*r even t the pr e s * f r om 
cover i ng the in v a s i o n " <Sc hr aeder , 1 9 8 9 ! 1 4 0 > .
Once again the "Red Th re a t"  was put on parade 
for the p u b l i c ,  th i s  overthrow was a communist 
t hreat to t he Car i bbean r eg ion,  t he Cuban 
c OCTimun i s  t s wer e beh i nd the whole t h i n g .
C o n v e n ie n t excuses  c o n s i d e r i n g  t hat  the C a s t r o  
goverom en t de ni ed any par t i c i p a t  i on and condemned 
th e  coup d e t a t .
T he  P e r s i a n  Gu l f  and I r a n  -  The ■'Un i ' ted -States'  
t r i e d  to bu i 1d up mu 1t i 1 at er a 1 supper t f or i t  s 
naval  b u i l d u p  in the P e r s i a n  G u l f  but o n l y  Great  
B r i t a i n  .and T r a n c e  s#f*-t:; smal 1 naval  f o r c e s y 'a 'f 'i t r
28
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intense diplomatic  pressure.  Japan refused 
involvement and Persian Gulf  a l l i e s  of c l i e n t  
sta te s gave small covert  s u p p o r t . Reagan was 
attempting to n u l l i f y  growing I rania n power in the 
r e g i o n  a l t h o u g h  p r o t e c t i o n  of U n i t e d  S t a t e s  f l a g  
shi  ppi  ng m  the Gy I f  was the o f f i c i a l  l i n e .  I r  an 
and I r a q  had been e m b r o i l e d  in a l ong b i t t e r  war 
and the U n i t e d  S t a t e s  had j u s t  t i l t e d  in I r a q ' s  
f a v e r , T h e  MRed T h r e a t “ was agai n  men11 oned but 
more em phasis was p l a c e d  on c onc er n  over I s l a m i c  
f u n d a m e n t a l i s m .  ( Ri chman,  1987*2) .  Long term  
consequences of t h i s  e pi s o d e  have been d e c i s i v e l y  
n e g a t i v e ,
Reagan has been c a l l e d  the Imperial  President 
because of h is  bypassing of Congress arid the 
American p u b l ic  in decisionmaking and because of 
the empire b u i l d i n g  over tones of h is  use of for ce 
in T h i r d  World countries* Many s t i l l  see him as a 
strong d e c i s i v e  presid ent  who br ought Amer ica back 
to power and g l o r y .  The economy boomed d u r in g  h i s  
terms but a f t e r e f f e c t s  reveal a shaky foundation 
for t h i s  prosperous new economy. The f a i l u r e  of 
hi s  s u p p l y - s i d e  economics were not the only 
tarnished on Reagans re cor d .  The I r a n - C o n t r a  arms
scandal rocked the in t e r n a t io n a l  scene and once 
*9ain  gave the American pu bl ic  reason to mi st ru st  
the president  and government in g e n e r a l . Host of 
the negative media though was m i sd i r e c te d  towards 
O l i v e r  North,  who g r a c i o u s l y  "took a f a l l "  for 
President  Reagan, who could not seem to remember 
anything about I r a n ,  weapons deals or unauthor ized 
aid  to the Contras*
ihM SdM i-1-lxitft tfai W '§
Even though Reagan's star  was s l i g h t l y  tarnished 
hi s V ic e  P r e s id e n t ,  George Bush e a s i l y  won the 
e l e c t i o n  in 1988. Bush, a soft  spoken Texan was 
portray ed  in the media as a wimp, l a te r  he proved 
them wrong w ith  h i s  aggressive for eign  p o l i c y  
i n i t i a t i v e s .  As former head of the CIA,  Bush was 
no stranger  to covert  operat ions and seemed 
i n c l i n e d  towards deal ing with  for eign  ma tters ,  
even at the expense of domestic p o l i c y .  He aided 
in s u c c e s s f u l l y  n t g o t i a t I n g  several  peace 
t r e a t i e s ,  i n c l u d i n g  those in Afg ha nis ta n,
Nicaragua and Angola.  Whether these cease f i r e s  
w i l l  l a s t  remains to be see n.
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Dry gs have 1 eng been a pr ob 1 me- i n the U n i t e d  
S t a t e s .  Drugs l i k e  h e r o i n ,  c o c a i n e  and i t *  cheap 
der i va, t i v e , c r ac k , Or ac k i = h i gh 1 y a d d i c t !  v e , 
a \ m o s t a 1 w a y * - fatal  t o t h e u s e r ,  c h e a. p a nd ea« v t o 
o b t a i n .  To mak e cr ac V. one mu * t h a* -v c oc a l n e f r c*m 
the coca p l a n t ,  whi ch r -  grown pr imar i ’ v i n T h i r d 
Wor l d c cun t r i e s ,  h ar ve * t ed an d smu gg 1 ed i n ». o  t he 
F i r s t  W o r l d .  The adven t o 4  c ? ac r aid s ts 
r e s u l t a n t  war s  between gang* and c i v i  1 i an de* th s 
prompted P r e s i d e n t  Bush ' £ "War or. D r u g * ’' .  He wa t  
n o t the f i r s  t pr es i den t wh o w q u  I d pr oc I a j rr* u *•<a r 
on d r ug s  but  he was the f i r s t  who wou 1 d use i t  to 
mi 1 i t ar  l 1 v i r« t er vene \ n a f or e i gr. coun t r v .
General  Manuel N o r i e g a  came to power in 
Panama in 1983.  He c r e a t e d  the Panama. Defense 
F o r c e s  and p l a c e d  a l l  m i l i t a r y ,  p o l i c e  and 
immi gr a t i on f u n c t i o n *  under i t s  c on t r o I . Nor i ega 
was e s s e n t i a l l y  de f a c t o  r u l e r  of Panama. He 
we 11  omed dr ug t r a.f f k i ng and pr o f 1 1 ed h i g h 1 y f r om 
i t ,  Panama became a major  l i n k  in the dr ug  
t r a f f i c  r o u t e .  Nor  i ega wa s a I so a p a i d  agent of 
the C e n t r a !  I n t e l l i g e n c e  Ag e n c y .  In 1987, a f t e r  
p u b l i c  ex po s u r e  of Noriega,  as a d r ug  t r a f  i her and 
accu sat i o n s  of e l e c t i o n  f r a u d ,  the Un i t ed S t a t e s
stopped m i l i t a r y  a i d  to Panama. In 1 v :::h two 
F 1 or ida gr and j ur 1 es r e t u r n e d  c r i m i n a l  i n d i e  tmen t 
a g a i n s t  Nor 1 ega over h i s dr ug smu go I 1 n g , mon ev 
1 aunder i ng and f or pr ovl  dl  ng a« yI um t o the 
M e d e l l i n  dr ug  C a r t e l  when they wer e oust ed  from 
CoI ombi a . ( Nat son and Thorrta s , 199 1 : 4 8 5 0  > .
Re I a 11 on s be tween Pan ama arid t he US 
de t er i or  a t e d . In May 1*8* e l e c t * o n  s he! d l n 
Panama wer e denounced by i n t e r  nat  i on a } obser - /er a 
and P r e s i d e n t  Bush.  Economic s a n c t i o n s  wer e 
enac t e d  and h o s t i l e  e n c o u n t e r s  between Panamanian 
and US f o r c e s  s t a t i o n e d  a I r.ng the canal  ensued.
In December 1989 the Panamanian N a t i o n a l  Assembl y  
pas sed a r e s o 1u 11 on n amin g N o r l e g a  " c h i e f  of the 
gover nrrien t a n d m a >■ i mum 1 e a der o f n a 11 on a I 
I i  ber a 11 o n " .  The r e s o 1u11on f or m a I i zed h i s  
a l r e a d y  sw eeping powers in r e s p o n s e  to what i t  
t er med US aggr e s s i o n  •Nat son and T homas, 1991s 5 6 >  
T h i s  s u gg est ed  t hat  N o r i e g a  wo u l d  c o n t i n u e  to 
g o ve rn  Panama in  a manner a n t a g o n i s t i c  to U n i t e d  
S t a t e s  i n t e r e s t s .
Two a d m i n i s t r a t o r s  had t r i e d  to remove 
N o r i e g a  from  power .  Reagan went so far  as to 
a u t h o r i z e  the CIA to foment an u p r i s i n g  to
11 •■*6s t opped rru ] i U  r v  a i d ♦. o Pan ama . I n 1 93 3 
F l o r i d a  gr an d j u r i es r e  tu r-ned c r i m i r, a. 1 i n d i c ♦ n t 
a g a i n s t  Nor i eg a o'-’er- h i «  d r u g  smugg l.i n g , money 
1 au n der  m g  and tor  pr .y i d i n q a * y l um t +n $* 
M e d e l l i n  d ru g  C a r t e l  when thev were ousted  lf on 
C ol o m b ia ,  < Wa t son arid Thomas* 1 99 1 : 4 3 - CO * ,
d e l a t i o n s  between Panama and the US 
de t e r i o r  a t e d . I n May 1 9 8 9 e I ec t i on s h e ld  i n 
Pan am a wer e den ounced by i n t er n a 11 on a I o b se r v e r  s 
and P r e s i d e n t  Bush,  Economic s a n c t i o n s  were 
en ac te d  and h o s t i l e  e n c o u n t e r s  between Panamani an 
and US f  o r c e s  s t a t  i oned a I ong the c ar. a 1 *n a,ued.
In December 1989 the Panamanian M a t ; ona 1 hc  sembly 
passed a r e s o l u t  ion naming N o r i ega " c h i e f  o 4 the 
9over nmen t a n d ma x i mum 1 eade r o + n a 1 i o r* a 1 
1 l ber a11 o n w . The  r esc* 1 u t i on 4 orma 1 i zed la s 
a 1 r  eady sweeping power t  i r* response  to »,»hat i1 
termed US a g g r e s s i o n  (Watson and Thomas,  199i ;5S> 
T h i s  su gg e st e d  tha t  N o r i e g a  would  c o n t i n u e  to 
govern  Panama in a manner a n t a g o n i s t i c  to U n i t e d  
S t a t e s  i n t e r e s t s .
Two a d m i n i s t r a t o r s  had t r i e d  to remove 
N o r i e g a  from power .  Reagan went so f a r  as to 
a u t h o r i z e  the C I A  to foment an u p r i s i n g  to 
w e r  throw Nor i ega , the Senate I n t e l  l i g e n c e
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Hoi*# would AmoHck* #or#i#r» p o l l * *  
ih# #r»d of the- Cold t^#r# r>°
threat  *rom th# S o v i e t s - b y  !**•• *** IMidn \ *’',• 
crumbling, S#veral #®pubHcs w#r* tbr#*t#nin£- 
r^o lu t ion  in a o H  ' ^©r autonomy * • I i
Cowpufti i-t coimtr k*§ bad a * * u adv d#c I ared . .-
j nd#p#nd#r?c# ?nd brofcon ti#< with tb#
Economic and pol i t ical  matabi ? * t i #* with in. it# . 
Union r#suH#d in total di&ar^ay. l^^r# aa*
1 on g#r- 'a * £ #d Thr #a t * * * * i a a I tbi^ poin t l* a «  ^  ^  ^^
^  &natb#f' taunttri##. , , ^
/‘ fr#fid#r»t .IMtlv’s; * y f *  ;ti#rn#0 * M * * ’ ; - •; ^
: ^ .  .. ., .; - ^ i V d ' W # : l d  a g a i n * . - . \ . ' l “ • k *;■-:’ 
': v ; Thi* tin>* Uh( t*<l states
^ S e S i , - ^ ;  . . .  , ^
. boon (M*ebJ«Bntic for- th* UftJ v#d,i , e f i R ; f r w * ^ m v w, t wt  ■ - W V  * ,* ,v /„**
**$**$ i^ t 9 if i» *  ■*!?•£ ^
*&»>'.* «1V:A * i i o ’ in v w *  K M -in *  *«***ift t»«d boon ' '
td^d©" .{s,;©^ --■f.Or‘ ■ S-.€W*.
e n  ' W f t i . ^ y ^ i * ^ * * * * *  •■•
thtt  t M  y « ‘ t*d Stfcto* not if.vc)v^«J
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to  Saudi A ra bia  to cut o44 I r a q i  troops from 
f u r t h e r  tnovements and pressured the United N a t ion t  
to enact economic sanctions against I r a q .  When 
the sanctions d id  not cause Hussein to be deposed, 
Pr es ident  Push had to coerce Congress i n t o  
d e c l a r i n g  w a r . The e x i l e d  Kuwaiti  monar chy h i r e d  
an American a d v e r t i s i n g  4 irm to propagandize the 
American p u bl ic  i n t o  support ing  an in vas io n.
Pleas were made by e x i l e d  Kuwaitis  to Congress 
t e l l i n g  o# babies thrown -from incubators  by I r a q i  
t roo ps and other  human r i g h t s  i n d i g n i t i e s .  These 
statements were l a t e r  proved to be f r a u d a l e n t .
The concerted e ffo rts  worked# in daouary it9t 
America and her a l l i e s  declared war against Iraq
f i r e  'than'^o\;iraql Iprces? Hundreds
i®§e®p: " *■
f» *> - .
of I r . q i  . o l d i o r *  thr*w down t h o i r  w**pon* *nd

gi *.
■#5S8 
V >
Th# i u m  United Nation* sanction* enacted before 
th# war ara a t i l l  in effe ct .  Th# t ra q ir  peopl•
• t i l l  suffer ,  more so now that th* sanction* have 
been in effect for so tone and shortage* c»o?#d by 
th* war hav* become s*v*r*. Saddam Hussein do*s 
not s u ffe r , nor d e n  h is  government.
Chanter 8 Conclusions
J
How many times w i l l  America intervene In th* 
remaining years of thj*  IPOS'*? No on* can 
p r e d ic t .  America's r o le  as global policeman is  
shortsighted and gc-sttdios*. Our nation f a l l s  in to  
economic decay w hile  oor President continues to 
t o l l  other countries how to behave. President 
tush talked Of a, "Now World Order* when he :
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manner to foreign c r is e s .  I f  diplomacy and 
sanctions do not work q u ick ly ,  us* fore* to solve 
the problem.
In Oftch intorvontion, d iroct  or parami1i t * r y ,  
in tho years ftinco Vietnam, tho ctfttod objectives 
woro either w i ly  p*rtift1ly achieved or not 
achieved « t  ftl 1. Tho tr*ck record speaks for 
i t s e l f .  So, why doe* tho United State* stubbornly 
continue to use intervention as * problem solving 
tool? Possibly beeftuse the US c * p i t a l is t i c  system 
requires economic colonist ism of other countries 
to perpetuate i t s e l f .  I f  unable to exploit  ether 
countries markets the system would f a i l  in on 
i t s e l f .  I t  is  a prerequis ite  of the need for 
markets and resources.mhe» a huge wealthy nation
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no control
8t*to* roquiro* could no loRjtr bo dictotod if lho 
lo*dor* did not owo thoir powor to tho Uni tod 
8t*to*. Roquirod morkot* *nd rosourcoo would bo 
eloood to thorn, couoinq wido»pro*d oconanic 
foituro* in not only tho US but *11 indu*tri*tizod 
c*pit«li*tic countrio**
Tho Uni tod 8t*tos h** no r iq h t  to ch**ti*o * 
country life# tr*q th*t *t*tod thoy woro rocl* in in q  
Kuw*it bockuco i t  w** o r iq i n k l l y  port of l r « q .  
fhb Uni tod St* to* d id  tho own* thinq with !*r*ol 
fcftor Ws*1d *§*r I I . Aworic*, tho bootion of 
d*o>ocr* cy ,  koop* dictator*  in  powor *• lonq ** i t  ■ 
fui 'to  our Rood** Th* hypocrloy io  t o t * l . Tho 
itettod ttoto* i *  not * q1ob*l p o tU d M if  but *
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no Hod Throat to deter. So tho ju s t if ic a t io n s  
were Uni tod Statos intorosts and human r ig h ts  
abuses, tho samo kind of human r ig h ts  abusos that 
tho United Statos turns a blind eye to in South 
A fr ic a  and China. Exactly what aro US intorosts? 
Tho oil  and rosourcos in thoso countrios bolong to 
thorn, tho US has no r ig h t  to thorn, or to dictato 
how or at what prico thoy aro sold. Bocauso 
Amorican loadors and pooplo in gonoral rofuso to 
ovon oxamino tho v a l i d i t y  of any oconomic systom 
but tho free market which requires colonisation, 
oxploitation and tho continual uso of fore© to 
guarantee cooporation, things aro not 1ikoly to 
chango.
Thoso aro some of tho reasons why tho Unitod 
Statos intervenes. No mattor who is  in powor, 
Ropublicans, Democrats, or an independent, or what 
tho Amorican public wants, tho Uni tod Statos w i 11 
continuo to intorvono as long as wo rofuso to look 
at tho fact that our oconomic systom is  ©no based 
on this typo of behaviour. There is  no perfect 
oconomic systom, capitalism, communism and 
socialism a l l  havo advantages and disadvantages. 
Until  wo care enough about tho r ig h ts  of all  human
no M  T h r t » t  to dotor. So tho ju s t if ic a t io n s  
woro Uni tod Statos intorosts and human rights  
abut*** tho tarn# kind of human r ig h ts  abusos that 
th# Uni tod Statos turns a blind oyo to in South 
A fr ica  and China. Exactly what ar# US intorosts? 
Th# oil  and r#sourc#s in th#s# court t r io s  bolong to 
thorn, tho US has no r ig h t  to thorn, or to dictato 
how or at what prico thoy art  sold. Bocauso 
Amor lean loadors and pooplo in gonoral rofuso to 
ovon oxamino tho v a l i d i t y  of any oconomic systom 
but tho froo markot which robuiros colonisation, 
oxploitation and tho continual uso of fore# to 
guarantoo cooporation, things aro not l ik o ly  to 
chango.
Thoso aro somo of tho reasons why tho Uni tod 
Statos intorvonos. No mattor who is  in power, 
Ropublicans, Domocrats, or an independent, or what 
tho Amorican public wants, tho Uni tod Statos w i l l  
continuo to intorvono as long as wo rofuso to look 
at tho fact that our oconomic systom is  ono basod 
on this typo of bohaviour. Thoro is  no perfect 
oconomic systom, capitalism, communism and 
socialism a l l  havo advantagos and disadvantagos. 
Until  wo car# onough about tho r ig h ts  of all  human
no Rad Thraat to dstar.  So ths ju s t if ic a t io n s  
war# Unitsd Stats* intarasts and human rights  
abuss*, ths tarns kind of human r igh t*  abuts* that 
ths Unitsd Stats* turns a blind ays to in South 
A fr ica  and China. Exactly what ars US intarasts? 
rhs oil  and rssourcss in thsss countriss bslong to 
thsm, th# 4MI has no r ig h t  to thtrn, or to d ictats  
how or at what pries thsy ars s o ld . Bscauss 
Amsrican Isadora and psopls in gsnsral rsfuss to 
avan sxamins ths v a l i d i t y  of any sconomic systsm 
but ths frso markst which rsquirat  colonization, 
sxploitation and th# continual usa of fores to 
guarantss eooparation, things ars not 1iksly  to 
changs.
That# ars tom# of ths reasons why ths Unitsd 
Statss intsrvsns*. No mattsr who is  in powsrf
Rspublican*, Damocratst or an indspsndsntf or what 
ths Amsrican p u b lit  wantsf ths Uni tsd Statss w i 11 
continus to intsrvsns as long at ws rsfuss to look 
at ths fact that our sconomic systsm is ons bassd 
on this typs of ishaviour.  Thsrs is  no parfact 
sconomic *yst#m9 capital ism» communism and 
socialism a l 1 havs advanfags* and disadvantagss.
Until  ws cars snough about ths r ig h ts  of all human
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